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Ia mwriting in further response to
September 17, 1973, which requested
certain criticisms of monetary policy
year.
As stated in your letter, the criticisms are: (1) “that
there was too much variation from time to time in the
rate of increase in the money supply, that monetary
policy was too erratic, too much characterized by
stops and starts”; and (2) “that the money supply had
increased much too much last year, in fact that the
increase would have been too much even if we had
been in the depths of a recession instead of enjoying
a fairly vigorous economic expansion.”
These criticisms involve basic issues with regard to
the role of money in the economy, and the role
that the money supply should play in the formula-
tion and execution of monetary policy. These issues,
along with the specific points you raise, require care-
ful examination.
Criticism 4 Our Public Policies
During the past two years the American economy
has experienced a substantial measure of prosperity.
Real output has increased sharply, jobs have been
created for millions of additional workers, and total
personal income — both in dollars and in terms of real
purchasing power — has risen to the highest levels
ever reached.
Yet the prosperity has been a troubled one. Price
increases have been large and widespread. For a time,
the unemployment rate remained unduly high. Inter-
est rates have risen sharply since the spring of 1972.
Mortgage money has recently become difficult to ob-
tain in many communities. And confidence in the
dollar at home and abroad has at times wavered.
Many observers have blamed these difficulties on
the management of public economic policies. Cer-
tainly, the Federal budget — despite vigorous efforts
to hold expenditures down — continued in substantial
deficit. There has also been an enormous growth in
the activities of Federally-sponsored agencies which,
although technically outside the budget, must still be
financed. The results of efforts to control wages and
prices during the past year have been disappointing.
Partial decontrol in early 1973 and the subsequent
freeze failed to bring the results that were hoped for.
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Monetary policy has been criticized on some\vhat
contradictory counts — for being inflationary, or for
permitting too high a level of interest rates, or for
failing to bring the economy back to full employment,
or for permitting excessive short-term variations in the
growth of the money supply, and so on.
One indication of dissatisfaction with our public
policies was provided by a report, to which you refer
in your letter, on a questionnaire survey conducted
by the National Association of Business Economists.
Of the respondents, 38 per cent rated fiscal policy
“over the past year” as “poor”; 41 per cent rated
monetary policy “over the past year” as “poor”; only
14 per cent felt that the wage-price controls under
Phase IV were “about right.” If this sampling is at
all indicative, tile public policies on which we have
relied are being widely questioned. Many members
of the above group, in fact, went on record for a
significant change in fiscal policy. In response to a
question \vhether they favored a variable investment
tax credit, 48.5 per cent said “yes,” 40 per cent said
“no,” and 13.5 per cent expressed “110 optn~on.
Let me turn now to the questions raised in your
letter and in some other recent discussions about mon-
etary policy. I shall discuss, in particular, the role of
money supply in the conduct of monetary policy; the
extent and significance of variability in the growth of
the money supply; and the actual behavior of the
money supply during 1972-73.
Role of Money Supply
For many years economists have debated the role
of the money supply in the performance of economic
systems. One school of thought, often termed “mone-
tarist,” claims that changes in the money supply in-
fluence very importantly, perhaps even decisively, the
pace of economic activity and the level of prices.
Monetarists contend that the monetary authorities
should pay principal attention to the money supply,
rather than to other financial variables such as inter-
est rates, in the conduct of monetary policy. They
also contend that fiscal policy has only a small in-
dependent impact on the economy.
Another school of thought places less emphasis on
the money supply and assigns more importance to the
expenditure and tax policies of the Federal Govern-
inent as factors influencing real econoniic activity and
the level of prices. This school emphasizes the need
for monetary policy to he concerned with interest
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rates and with conditions in the money and capital
markets. Some economic activities, particularly resi-
dential building and state and local government con-
struction, depend heavily on borrowed funds, and are
therefore influenced greatly by changes in the cost
and availability of credit, In other categories of spend-
ing — such as business investment in fixed capital and
inventories, and consumer purchases of durable goods
— credit conditions play a less decisive role, but
they are nonetheless important.
Monetarists recognize that monetary policy affects
private spending in part through its imnpact on inter-
est rates and other credit terms. But they believe that
primary attention to the growth of the money supply
will result in a more appropriate monetary policy than
would attention to conditions in the credit markets.
Needless to say, monetary policy is — and has long
been — a controversial sul4ect. Even the monetarists
do not speak with one voice on monetary policy.
Some influential monetarists believe that monetary
policy should aim strictly at maintaining a constant
rate of growth of the money supply. Ho~vever,what
that constant should be, or how broadly the money
supply should be defined, are matters on which mone-
tarists still differ. And there are also monetarists who
would allow some — but infrequent — changes in the
rate of gro\vth of the money supply, in accordance
with changing economic conditions.
It seems self-evident that adherence to a rigid
groxvth rate rule, or even one that is changed in-
frequently, would practically prevent monetary policy
from playing an active role in economic stabilization.
Monetarists recognize this. They believe that most
economic disturbances tend to be self-correcting, and
they therefore argue that a constant or nearly constant
rate of growth of the money supply would result in
reasonably satisfactory economic performance.
But neither historical evidence, nor the thrust of
explorations in business-cycle theory over a long cen-
tury, give support to the notion that our economy is
inherently stable. On the contrary, experience has
demonstrated repeatedly that blind reliance on the
self-correcting properties of our economic system can
lead to serious trouble. Discretionary economic policy,
while it has at times led to mistakes, has more often
proved reasonably successful. The disappearance of
business depressions, which in earlier times spelled
mass unemployment for workers and mass bankrupt-FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS
cies for businessmen, is largely attributable to the
stabilization policies of the last thirty years.
The fact is that the internal workings of a market
economy tend of themselves to generate business fluc-
tuations, and most modem economists recognize this.
For example, improved prospects for profits often spur
unsustainable bursts of investment spending. The flow
of personal income in an age of affluence allows
ample latitude for changes in discretionary expendi-
tures and in savings rates. During a business-cycle
expansion various imbalances tend to develop within
the economy — between aggregate inventories and
sales, or between aggregate business investment in
fixed capital and consumer outlays, or between aver-
age unit costs of production and prices. Such im-
balances give rise to cyclical movements in the econ-
omy. Flexible fiscal and monetary policies, therefore,
are often needed to cope with undesirable economic
developments, and this need is not diminished by the
fact that our available tools of economic stabilization
leave something to be desired.
There is general agreement among economists that,
as a rule, the effects of stabilization policies occur
gradually over time, and that economic forecasts are
an essential tool of policy making. However, no econ-
omist — or school of economics — has a monopoly on
accurate forecasting. At times, forecasts based largely
on the money supply have turned out to be satis-
factory. At other times, such forecasts have been quite
poor, mainly because of unanticipated changes in thc
intensity with which the existing money stock is used
by business firms and consumers.
Changes in the rate of turnover of money have
historically played a large role in economic fluctua-
tions, and they continue to do so, For example, the
narrowly-defined money stock — that is, demand de-
posits plus currency in public circulation — grew by
5.7 per cent between the fourth quarter of 1969 and
the fourth quarter of 1970. But the turnover of money
declined during that year, and the dollar value of GNP
rose only 4.5 per cent. In the following year, the
growth rate of the money supply increased to 6.9 per
cent, but the turnover of money picked up briskly
and the dollar value of CNP accelerated to 9,3 per
cent. The movement out of recession in 1970 into
recovery in 1971 was thus closely related to the greater
intensity in the use of money. Occurrences such as
this are very common because the willingness to use
the existing stock of money, expressed in its rate of
turnover, is a highly dynamic force in economic life.
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For this as well as other reasons, the Federal Re-
serve uses a blend of forecasting techniques. The be-
havior of the money supply and other financial vari-
ables is accorded careful attention. So also are the
results of the most recent surveys on plant and equip-
ment spending, consumer attitudes, and inventory
plans. Recent trends in key producing and spending
sectors are analyzed. The opinions of businessmen and
outside economic analysts are canvassed, in part
through the nationwide contacts of Federal Reserve
Banks. And an assessment is made of the probable
course of fiscal policy, also of labor-market and agri-
cultural policies, and their effects on the economy.
Evidence from all these sources is weighed. Efforts
are also made to assess economic developments
through the use of large-scale econometric models.
An eclectic approach is thus taken by the Federal
Reserve, in recognition of the fact that the state of
economic knowledge does not justify reliance on any
single forecasting technique. As economic research
has cumulated, it has become increasingly clear that
money does indeed matter. But other financial vari-
ables also matter.
In recent years, the Federal Reserve has placed
somewhat more emphasis on achieving desired growth
rates of the monetary aggregates, including the
narrowly-defined money supply, in its conduct of mon-
etary policy. But we have continued to give careful
attention to other financial indicators, among them
the level of interest rates on mortgages and other
loans and the liquidity position of financial institutions
and the general public. This is necessary because the
economic implications of any given monetary growth
rate depend on the state of liquidity, the attitudes of
businessmen, investors, and consumers toward liquid-
ity, the cost and availability of borrowed funds, and
other factors. Also, as the nation’s central bank, the
Federal Reserve can never lose sight of its role as a
lender of last resort, so that financial crises and panics
will be averted.
I recognize that one advantage of maintaining a
relatively stable growth rate of the money supply is
that a partial offset is thereby provided to unexpected
and undesired shifts in the aggregate demand for
goods and services. There is always some uncertainty
as to the emerging strength of aggregate demand, If
money growth is maintained at a rather stable rate,
and aggregate demand turns out to be weaker than
is consistent with the nation’s economic objectives, in-
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terest rates wifi tend to decline and the easing of
credit markets should help to moderate the undesired
weakness in demand. Simnilarly, if the demand for
goods and services threatens to outrun productive
capacity, a rather stable rate of monetary growth will
provide a restraining influence on the supply of credit
and thus tend to restrain excessive spending.
Hosvever, it would be unwise for monetary policy
to aim at all times at a constant or nearly constant
rate of growth of money balances. The money growth
rate that can contribute most to national objectives
will vary with economic conditions. For example, if
the aggregate demand for goods and services is un-
usually weak, or if the demand for liquidity is un-
usually strong, a rate of increase in the money supply
well above the desirable long-term trend may be
needed for a time. Again, when the economy is ex-
periencing severe cost-push inflation, a moi~etary
growth rate that is relatively high by a historical
yardstick may have to be tolerated for a time. If
money growth were severely constrained in order to
combat the element of inflation resulting from such a
cause, it might well have seriously adverse effects on
production and employment. In short, what growth
rate of the money supply is appropriate at any given
time cannot be determined simply by extrapolating
past trends or by some preconceived arithmetical
standard,
Moreover, for purposes of conducting monetary pol-
icy, it is never safe to rely on just one concept of
money — even if that concept happens to be fashion-
able. A variety of plausible concepts merit careful
attention, because a number of financial assets serve
as a convenient, safe, and liquid store of purchasing
power.
The Federal Reserve publishes data corresponding
to three definitions of money, and takes all of them
into account in determining policy. The three measures
are: (a) the narrowly-defined money stock (M ),
which encompasses currency and demand deposits
held by the nonbank public; (b) a more broadly-
defined money stock (M2), which also includes time
and savings deposits at commercial banks (other than
large negotiable time certificates of deposit); (c) a
still broader definition (M;~),which includes savings
deposits at mutual savings banks and savings and loan
associations. A definition embracing other liquid as-
sets could also be justified — for example, one that
would include large-denomination negotiable time cer-
tificates of deposit, U.S. savings bonds and Treasury
Page 18
NOVEMBER 1973
bills, commercial paper, and other short-term money
market instruments.
There are many assets closely related to cash, and
the public can switch readily among these assets.
However money may be defined, the task of determin-
ing the amount of money needed to maintain high
employment and reasonable stability of the general
price level is complicated by shifting preferences of
the public for cash and other financial assets.
Varübill~yofMonep &pp~yGrowth
In the short run, the rate of change in the observed
money supply is quite erratic, and cannot be trusted
as an indicator of the course of monetary policy.
This would be so even if there were no errors of
mneasurement.
The record of hearings held by the Joint Economic
Committee on June 27, 1973 includes a memorandum
which I submitted on problems encountered in con-
trolling the money supply. As indicated there, week-
to-week, month-to-month, and even quarter-to-quarter
fluctuations in the rate of change of money balances
are frequently influenced by international flows of
funds, changes in the level of U.S Government de-
posits, and sudden changes in the public’s attitude
towards liquidity. Some of these variations appear to
be essentially random — a product of the enormous
ebb and flow of funds in our modern economy.
Because the demands of the public for money are
subject to rather wide short-term variations, efforts by
the Federal Reserve to maintain a constant growth
rate of the money supply could lead to sharp short-run
swings in interest rates and risk damage to financial
markets and the economy. Uncertainties about financ-
ing costs could reduce the fluidity of markets and
increase the costs of financing to borrowers. In addi-
tion, wide and erratic movements of interest rates and
financial conditions could have undesirable effects on
business and consumer spending. These adverse ef-
fects may not be of major dimensions, but it is better
to avoid them.
In any event, for a variety of reasons explained in
the memorandum for the Joint Economic Committee,
to which I have previously referred, the Federal Re-
serve does not have precise control over the money
supply. To give one example, a significant part of the
money supply consists of deposits lodged in non-
member banks that are not subject to the reserveFEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS NOVEMBER 1973
requirements set by the Federal Reserve. As a result
there is some slippage in monetary control. Further-
more, since deposits at nonmember banks have been
reported for only two to four days in a year, in con-
trast to daily statistics for member banks, the data on
the money supply — which we regularly present on a
weekly, monthly, and quarterly basis — are estimates
rather than precise measurements. When the infre-
quent reports from nonmember banks become avail-
able, they often necessitate considerable revisions of
the money supply figures. In the past two years, the
revisions were upward, and this may happen again
this year.
Some indication of the extent of short-term varia-
tions in the recorded money supply is provided below.
Table I shows the average and maximum deviations
(without regard to sign) of M1 from its average an-
nual growth rate over a three and a half year period.
As would be expected, the degree of variation dimin-
ishes as the thne unit lengthens; it is much larger for
monthly than for quarterly data, and is also larger
for quarterly than for semi-annual data.
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In our judgment, there need be little reason for
concern about the short-run variations that occur in
the rate of change in the money stock. Such variations
have minimal effects on the real economy. For one
thing, the outstanding supply of money is very large.
It is also quite stable, even when the short-run rate
of change is unstable. This October the average out-
standing supply of M1, seasonally adjusted, was about
$264 billion. On this base, a monthly rise or fall in
the money stock of even $2.5 billion would amount
to only a 1 per cent change. But when such a tempo-
rary change is expressed as an annual rate, as is now
commonly done, it comes out as about 12 per cent
and attracts attention far beyond its real significance.
The Federal Reserve research staff has investigated
carefully the economic implications of variability in
M1 growth. The experience of the past two decades
suggests that even an abnormally large or abnormally
small rate of growth of the money stock over a period
up to six months or so has a negligible influence on
the course of the economy — provided it is subse-
quently offset. Such short-run variations in the rate
of change in the money supply may not at all reflect
Federal Reserve policy, and they do not justify the
attention they often receive from financial analysts.
The thrust of monetary policy and its probable
effects on economic activity can only be determined
by observing the course of the money supply and of
other monetary aggregates over periods lasting six
months or so. Even then, care must be taken to
measure the growth of money balances in ways that
temper the influence of short-term variations, For ex-
ample, the growth of money balances over a quar-
ter can be measured from the amount outstanding in
the last month of the preceding quarter to the last
month of the current quarter, or from the average
amount outstanding during the preceding quarter to
the average in the current quarter. The first measure
captures the latest tendencies in the money supply,
but may be distorted by random changes that have
no lasting significance. The second measure tends to
average out temporary fluctuations and is comparable
to the data provided on a wide range of non-monetary
economic variables, such as the gross national product
and related measures.
A comparison of these two ways of measuring the
rate of growth in M1 is shown in Table II for succes-
sive quarters in 1972 and 1973. The first column,
labeled M, shows annual rates calculated from end-
months of quarters; the second column, labeled Q,
shows annual rates calculated from quarterly averages.
Tob’’~II
GROWTH RATES OF MONEY SUPPLY ON TWO BASES
Annual Ratei ci Chnnge
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As may be seen, the quarterly averages disclose
much more clearly the developing trend of monetary
restraint — which, in fact, began in the second quarter
of 1972. Also, the growth of M1, which on a mnonth-
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end basis appears very erratic in the first three quar-
ters of 1973, is much more stable on a quarterly
average basis. For example, while the level of Mm did
not expand significantly between June and September,
the quarterly average figures indicate further sizable
growth in the third quarter. For purposes of eco-
nomic analysis, it is an advantage to recognize that
the money available for use was appreciably larger
in the third quarter than in the second quarter.
Experience of 1972-73
During 1972, it was the responsibility of the Fed-
eral Reserve to encourage a rate of economic expan-
sion adequate to reduce unemployment to accepta-
ble levels, At the same time, despite the dampening
effects of the wage-price control program, inflationary
pressures were gathering. Monetary policy, therefore,
had to balance the twin objectives of containing infla-
tionary pressures and encouraging economic growth.
These objectives were to some extent conflicting, and
monetary policy alone could not be expected to cope
with both problms. Continuation of an effective wage-
price program and a firmer policy of fiscal restraint
were urgently needed.
The narrowly-defined money stock increased 7.4
per cent during 1972 (measured from the fourth
quarter of 1971 to the fourth quarter of 1972). Be-
tween the third quarter of 1972 and the third quarter
of 1973, the growth rate was 6.1 per cent. By the first
half of 1973, the annual growth rate had declined
to 5.8 per cent, and a further slowing occurred in the
third quarter.
Evaluation of the appropriateness of these growth
rates would require full analysis of the economic and
financial objectives, conditions, and policies during
the past two years, if not longer. Such an analysis
cannot be undertaken here. Some perspective on
monetary developments during 1972-73 may be
gained, however, from comparisons with the experi-
ence of other industrial countries, and by recalling
briefly how domestic economic conditions evolved
during this period.
Table III compares the growth of M1 in the United
States with that of other industrial countries in 1972
and the first half of 1973. The definitions of M1 differ
somewhat from country to country, but are as nearly
comparable as statistical sources permit. It goes with-
out saying that each country faced its own set of
economic conditions and problems. Yet it is useful to
note that monetary growth in the United States was
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much lower than in other major industrial countries,
and that it also svas steadier than in the other
countries.
Tab’,: lit
ANNUAL PERCENT RATES OF GROWTH
IN MONEY SUPPLY
4th O~a, tar 19/1 4th Quartor 19/2
to 4th Quarter 1972 ‘a 2nd Quarte’ 1973
Urutr’d Staies 7 4 . 5.8”
L’n.~ed Kingdom 14 1 10.0
Ge, mary 14.3 4.2
FrarIcL’ 15.4 8.7
Japan 23.] 28.2
The liext table shows in summary fashion, the rates
of change in the mont’) supply of the United States,
in its total production, and in the consumer price level
during 1972 and 1973. The table is based on the
latest data, It may be noted, in passing, that, accord-
ing to data available as late as January 1973, the rate
of growth of Mm during 1972 was 7.2 percent, not 7.4
percent; and that the rate of increase in real GNP was
7.7 percent, not 7.0 percent. In other words, on the
basis of the data available during 1972, the rate of
growth of M1 was below the rate of growth of the
physical volume of over-all production.
Tab!t ‘v
MONEY SUPPLY, GNP, AND PRICES IN THE U.S.
I Pa runt thange at annual rates)
4th qua’ter
1971 ~ 4tn q’a’ er 19/2 to’




Money supply IM, 7.4 ‘ 5.5 5.6
G,oss NaP~onalPrecut,
Cu’rent dollars 10 6 12.1 11.7
Lonstans dollars 7.0 5.4 4.8
P Ct’S
cc’, J ‘U. r PS CC
‘ides (CPI) 34 /.1 78
c~texcl..aing tOad 4.0 40 4.]
The tal iie indicates t hat gri,wtis in \l~during l97~
and 1973 approximately matched the growth of real
output, but was far below the expansion in the dollar
value of the nation’s output. Although monetary pol-
icy limited the availability of money relative to the
growth of transactions demands, it still encouraged a
substantial expansion in economic activity; real output
rose by about 7 per cent in 1972, Even so, unem-
ployment remained unsatisfactorily high throughout
the greater part of the year. It was not until Novem-
ber that the unemployment rate dropped below 5.5
per cent. For the year as a whole, the unemployment
rate averaged 5.6 per cent. It may be of interest to
recall that unemployment averaged 5.5 per cent inFEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS NOVEMBER 1973
1954 and 1960, which are commonly regarded as
recession years.
Since the expansion of M1 in 1972 was low relative
to the demands for money and credit, it was accom-
panied by rising short-term interest rates. Long-term
interest rates showed little net change last year, as
credit demands were satisfied mainly in the short-term
markets.
In 1973, the growth of M1 moderated while the
transactions demands for cash and the turnover of
money accelerated. GNP in current dollars rose at a
12 per cent annual rate as prices rose more rapidly.
In credit markets, short-term interest rates rose sharply
further, while long-term interest rates also moved up,
though by substantially less than short-term rates.
The extraordinary upsurge of the price level this
year reflects a variety of special influences. First, there
has been a world-wide economic boom superimposed
on the boom in the United States. Second, we have
encountered critical shortages of basic materials. The
expansion in industrial capacity needed to produce
these materials had not been put in place earlier be-
cause of the abnormally low level of profits between
1966 and 1971 and also because of numerous im-
pediments to new investment on ecological grounds.
Third, farm product prices escalated sharply as a re-
sult of crop failures in many countries last year.
Fourth, fuel prices spurted upward, reflecting the
developing shortages in the energy field. And fifth,
the depreciation of the dollar in foreign exchange
markets has served to boost prices of imported goods
and to add to the demands pressing on our produc-
tive resources.
In view of these powerful special factors, and the
cyclical expansion of our economy, a sharp advance in
our price level would have been practically inevitable
in 1973. The upsurge of the price level this year hardly
represents either the basic trend of prices or time re-
sponse of prices to previous monetary or fiscal poli-
cies — whatever their shortcomings may have been. In
particular, as the above tables show, the explosion of
food prices that occurred this year is in large part
responsible for the accelerated rise in the over-all con-
sinner price level.
The severe rate of inflation that we have experi-
enced in 1973 cannot responsibly be attributed to
monetary management or to public policies more gen-
erally. In retrospect, it may well be that monetary
policy should have been a little less expansive in
1972. But a markedly more restrictive policy would
have led to a still sharper rise in interest rates and
risked a premature ending of the business expan-
sion, without limiting to any significant degree this
year’s upsurge of the price level.
Concluding Ohservrekns
The present inflation is the most serious economic
problem facing our country, and it poses great difficul-
ties for economicstabilization policies. We must recog-
nize, I believe, that it will take sonme time for the
forces of inflation, which now engulf our economy and
others around the world, to burn themselves out, In
today5s environment, controls on wages and prices
cannot be expected to yield the benefits they did in
1971 and 1972, when economic conditions were much
different. Primary reliance in dealing with inflation —
both in the near future and over the longer term —
will have to be placed on fiscal and monetary policies.
The prospects for regaining price stability would
be enhanced by improvements in our monetary and
fiscal instruments. The conduct of monetary policy
could be improved if steps were taken to increase
the precision with which the money supply can be
controlled by the Federal Reserve. Part of the present
control problem stems from statistical inadequacies —
chiefly the paucity of data on deposits at nonmember
banks. Also, however, control over the money supply
and other monetary aggregates is less precise than it
can or should be because nonmember banks are
not subject to the same reserve requirements as are
Federal Reserve members.
I hope that the Congress will support efforts to
rectify these deficiencies. For its part, the Federal
Reserve Board is even now carrying on discussions
with the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
about the need for better statistics on the nation’s
money supply. The Board also expects shortly to
recommend to the Congress legislation that will put
demand deposits at commercial banks on a uniform
basis from the standpoint of reserve requirements.
Improvements in our fiscal policies are also needed.
It is important for the Congress to put an end to
fragmented consideration of expenditures, to place a
firm ceiling on total Federal expenditures, and to
relate these expenditures to prospective revenues and
the nation’s economic needs. Fortunately, there is
now widespread recognition by members of the Con-
gress of the need to reform budgetary procedures
along thesebroad lines.
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It also is high time for fiscal policy to become a
more versatile tool of economic stabilization. Partic-
ularly appropriate would be fiscal instruments that
could be adapted quickly, under special legislative
rules, to changing economic conditions — such as a
variable tax credit for business investment in fixed
capital. Once again, I would urge the Congress to
give serious consideration to this urgently needed
reform.
We must strive also for better understanding of the
effects of economic stabilization policies on economic
activity and prices. Our knowledge in this area is
greater now than it was five or ten years ago, thanks
to extensive research undertaken by economists in
academic institutions, at the Federal Reserve, and
elsewhere. The keen interest of the Joint Economic
Committee in improving economic stabilization poli-
cies has, I believe, been an influence of great impor-
tance in stimulating this widespread research effort.
I look forward to continued cooperation with the
Committee in an effort to achieve the kind of economic
performance our citizens expect and deserve.
Sincerely yours,
ARTHUR F. BURNS
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